A good post from German forum
himself81: Liquidity is good - 2. Reading the balance sheet gives courage
Page 138 shows the consolidated balance sheet. As of 30 September 2018, the Group has cash and cash equivalents of € 1,275 million. In addition, there are another € 100 million from the subsidiaries and "held-for-sale" investments, and more later.
On the other side, there are a total of € 10.3 billion in gross debt (interest gearing). After rounding, net debt thus amounts to approximately € 9.1 billion. Everything is very clear in the tables and also many texts.
Now it is interesting, however, as far as the divestments and the associated cash flow are concerned:
1) For Kika-Leiner, no cash-relevant incoming payments have yet been posted. The purchase price of € 397 million has yet to be credited to receivables at the balance sheet date, see page 149, Notes 1.4 and Notes 12, which will continue to grow cash in H1 / 19.
2) Early-Bird Fees, LUA Fees, etc. have already been recorded in Balance Sheet 18, even if they are paid out in the future. These are therefore already cash neutral and will no longer burden the income statement in 19.
3) page 275, Notes 34 are extremely important, here the assets held-for-sale are listed in detail, in detail POCO (which again proves that no payment has been booked here, as the "totals" for assets and liabilities comply those on page 138 with which we initially started), the automotive branch, Mattress Firm, Steinpol and a smaller item "Other". All this has only a ridiculous book value of € 641 million, if you subtract POCO, it would even be only € 370 million. I would like to break down my assumptions: 370 million € can be redeemed alone in the automotive segment (at least for 100%, first only about 75% delivered). MF will be worth at least € 700 million (book value € 95 million) under Ch11 and approximately 50%, otherwise worth it in my view, no sales below this sum. Steinpol still had an enterprise value of € 26.5 million in the balance sheet if necessary. € 9 million, let's assume € 20 million. Book value for Steinpol is rated negatively. In addition, around € 0.3bn of interest-bearing debt is still part of it, although these are already reported separately and are no longer included in the above-mentioned € 10.3bn.
In total, we will be able to redeem approximately € 720 million more than net book values were estimated. These sales actions alone can more than make up for the current negative EK of the shareholders.
4) Conforama: Anyone expecting further depreciation here has not yet seen the balance sheet. See page 177, where goodwill is already stated as zero and brand values as € 200 million. What should be written off here in a great way? Internal debts are not a problem as they are fully consolidated and therefore neutral. Should Conforama be surrendered, then I expect Conforama's internal debts to SEAG (which should now be reduced to € 1.4 billion after a repayment, see Announcements), be canceled. Conforama would be worth about € 1.4 billion again. With this debt, the value is currently seen at zero (EC -0.5 billion € as at 31.12.2018, currently rather lower). If Seifert then gets 25% and in what form (from a negative book value?), I do not consider war decisive. Of course we want to know that prevented.
5) There were and are, of course, other major and minor events. We will see these with the balance sheet. For example, we already know about KAP sales for € 293 million.
So let's sum up:
Cash € 1275 million
Kika-Leiner € 397 million
POCO € 271 million
Further sales, see Item 3: € 370 million + € 720 million = € 1090 million
KAP € 293 million
Then Without taking into account other factors (high costs, but excluding interest payments, positive cash flow), it is expected that cash and cash equivalents of approximately € 3.3 billion will be available at the end of 2019. I assume that € 2 billion to € 2.6 billion can be used for repayments. The rest remains cash stock.
However, the net debt is suddenly only € 7 billion! While we continue to have negative effects, including the sale of Conforama and more conservative rather than optimistic assumptions, I believe that achieving a net liability of € 6.5 billion in the medium term is feasible.
The last few days here was an example of a forist with a net debt: EBITDA ratio of 8 as a critical limit. That would mean an EBITDA of approx. € 810 million for Steinhoff. Well, we have almost reached the fateful year 2018 under extremely adverse conditions for the "continued operations" ...
I still think the turnaround is feasible, even if the CVA had no direct impact on the existing debt burden. But in our sense, that could include more surprises.
Do not be alarmed by the current negative book value of Steinhoff. The management's plan is visible and feasible, and soon we will hear more positive news and numbers.
himself81:
Liquidity the 2.
Sure, I've forgotten something somewhere, such as the € 200 million from the burst Shoprite / Meadow Deal ... ;-) Can then do your own bills ...
at any time when he/she is in possession of unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities, or otherwise where clearance to deal is not given in terms of paragraph 3.66.
