Extract from the Ariva Forum: From NoCapital and Godhimself81:
"Analysis:
Page 138 shows the consolidated balance sheet, as at 30 September 2018 the Group reported cash and cash equivalents of 1275 million. In addition, there are actually another 100 million from the subsidiaries and investments "held-for-sale", with more to come later.
On the opposite side, there are a total of 10.3 billion gross debts (interest gearing). After rounding, net debt thus amounts to approx. 9.1 billion. All this is clearly stated in the tables and also in numerous texts.
But now it becomes interesting as far as the divestments and the corresponding cash flow are concerned:
1) For Kika-Leiner no cash-relevant incoming payments have yet been booked, the purchase price of 397 million is still booked under Receivables as of the balance sheet date, see page 149, Notes 1.4 and 12 respectively. This will further increase the cash position in H1/19.
2) Early bird fees, LUA fees etc. have already been recorded in balance sheet 18, even if they will only be paid in the future. These are therefore already cash-neutral and will no longer burden the income statement in 19.
3) Page 275, Notes 34 are extremely important, here the assets held for sale are listed in detail, in detail POCO (which again proves that no cash flow has yet been booked here, because the "totals" for assets and liabilities correspond to those on page 138 with which we initially started), the automotive branch, Mattress Firm, Steinpol and a smaller item "Other". All this has a ridiculous book value of only 641 million, if POCO were deducted, it would be only 370 million. I would like to break down my assumptions: 370 million will be generated in the automotive segment alone (at least for 100%, at first only about 75% will be sold). MF will be worth after Ch11 and for about 50% at least 700 million (book value 95 million), otherwise from my point of view no sale under this sum is worthwhile. At Steinpol, the 17th balance sheet still contained an enterprise value of 26.5 million less 9 million, if necessary, we assume 20 million. Book value for Steinpol is valued negatively. There are also some 0.3 billion in interest-bearing debt, although this is already shown separately and is no longer included in the 10.3 billion mentioned above.
In total, we will therefore be able to generate approximately 720 million more revenues than net book values were estimated. These sales alone can more than offset the current negative equity of shareholders.
4) Conforama: Anyone expecting further write-downs here has not yet looked at the balance sheet. Page 177 provides information on this, where goodwill is already stated at zero and brand values at 200 million. What else is there to write off in a great way? Internal debt is not a problem, as it is fully consolidated and therefore neutral. If Conforama is sold, then I expect that Conforama's internal debt to SEAG (after a repayment now only 1.4 billion, see Announcements) will be cancelled. Thus Conforama would again be worth approx. 1.4 billion. With these debts, the value can currently be seen at zero (EK -0.5 billion as of 31.12.2018, currently rather lower). Whether Seifert will then still get 25% and in what form (from a negative book value?), I don't look at it as decisive for the outcome. Of course, we want this to be prevented.
5) There were and are of course other bigger and smaller events. We will see these with the balance sheet. But we already know, for example, about the KAP sale for 293 million.
So let's add it up:
Cash 1275 million
Kika-Leiner 397 million
POCO 271 million
Further sales, see Note 3: 370 million + 720 million = 1090 million
CAP 293 million
Excluding other influences (high costs, but positive cash flow apart from interest payments), this will probably result in a cash position of around 3.3 billion at the end of 2019. I assume that between 2 billion and 2.6 billion can be used for repayments. The rest remains in cash.
Anyway, the net debt is suddenly only 7 billion ! We continue to have negative effects, but with the inclusion of a sale of Conforama and rather conservative than optimistic assumptions, I think it is feasible to achieve a net debt of 6.5 billion in the medium term.
The last few days here was an example of a forist with a Net Debt : EBITDA ratio of 8 as a critical limit. For Steinhoff, this would mean an EBITDA of approx. 810 million. Well, we almost achieved that in 2018, the year of our fate, under extremely adverse conditions for "continued operations"...
I still consider the turnaround feasible, even if the CVA would have no direct effect on the existing debt burden. However, this could contain further surprises in our sense.
Don't be alarmed by the current negative book value of Steinhoff. The management's plan is visible and feasible and soon we will hear more positive news and figures..."
Very good points made. Quote from another form #191468
